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Abstract. The prime characteristics of Mobile Ad Hoc Network (MANET) are 
infrastructure free, absence of centralized authority and dynamic nature of nodes which 
are more vulnerable to security attacks.  Reliability and security are prime issues to protect 
the information and nodes in a network during communication which has received more 
research interest in designing a dynamic secured routing scheme. QoS is set of service 
requirement that needs to be satisfied by the network during the data transmission in the 
network. From the perception of QoS best effort protocols ensure optimum network 
operation in an unpredictable mobile environment. The multimedia applications are 
intolerable towards delay and reliability which are the features of mobile network, hence 
the potentials of MANET were not utilized in multimedia  applications. These issues of 
delay and reliability of packet transmission in MANET are contributed by the stability of 
the communication link even during the mobility of the nodes. This necessitates to analyze 
the performance of various secured routing protocols based on the stability of the 
communication link in case of mobility of nodes during data transfer. The present study is 
focused on the comparative analysis on the various secured reactive routing protocols in 
MANET signifying the connectivity stability during the mobility of the nodes.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Wireless ad-hoc networks are composed of autonomous nodes that are self- managed without any 
infrastructure. In this way, ad-hoc networks have a dynamic topology such that nodes can easily join or 
leave the network at any time. They have many potential applications, especially, in military and rescue areas 
such as connecting soldiers on the battlefield or establishing a new network in place of a network which 
collapsed after a disaster like an earthquake. Ad-hoc networks are suitable for areas where it is not possible 
to set up a fixed infrastructure. Since the nodes communicate with each other without an infrastructure, 
they provide the connectivity by forwarding packets over themselves. To support this connectivity, nodes 
use some routing protocols such as AODV (Ad-hoc On-Demand Distance Vector), DSR (Dynamic Source 
Routing) and AOMDV (Ad-hoc On-Demand Multipath Distance Vector). In MANET the nodes are 
dynamic Mobilic rather than being static and get connected dynamically in an arbitrary manner from time to 
time which results in a change of topology. Besides acting as a host, each node also acts as a router to 
discover a path and forward packets to the correct node in the network During the mobility of the nodes 
the routes may get disconnected and the route discovery process has to be initiated to sustain the data 
communication, where the route cache is updated whenever an alternated route is selected or a new route is 
discovered for the same set of source and destination.  Thus, the responsibility of a routing protocol is to 
find the correct, efficient route to the destination node and also update the new route faster whenever there 
is a break in the link [1, 2, 3] during data transmission due to the mobility of the nodes. 
MANET is used in various applications like emergency search rescue operations, battle field 
communications between vehicle on movement, where all the communication among nodes should be 
reliable and secure. Many secure routing protocols have been proposed, which focuses on establishing a 
secure route, in the route discovery process but no results are being provided for updating of the route 
cache in the route maintenance phase in order to provide continuous connectivity between the nodes 
during mobility without compromising the security aspect. The lack of physical protection of nodes, 
vulnerability of statically configured security mechanism and energy constraints [4] are identified as 
challenges toward maintaining the connectivity during mobility.  This paper briefs about the comparison of 
the various secured Routing protocols on link reliability between the nodes in mobility during the  
communication. The rest of the paper is organized as, section 2 discusses the various security attacks 
occurring in routing protocols, secured routing protocols. Section 3 describes the concept of link stability 
and section 4 discusses the simulation study and results with section 5 giving the concluding remarks on the 
results of the study. 
 
2. Security Issues in Routing 
 
2.1. Routing  Attacks in MANETs 
 
Routing attacks are caused by injecting fake route request messages, fake routing information and fake link 
information that is classified into two categories based on the disruption caused by the attack. 
i) Route Disruption: Attacks that divert the legitimate data packets from the actual route that to be 
transmitted. 
ii) Resource Consumption: Attacks that consumes the network resources like bandwidth, power, 
storage such that the resources are not available disrupting the normal data transmission to legitimate users 
of the network. 
The common security attack encountered in resource consumption in mobile network is the Flooding 
attack. In this the attacker, tries to disturb the route discovery process by sending a large number of RREQ 
packet to a non-existing nodes. 
The major security attacks that disrupt the route are Blackhole attack, Link Spoofing Attack, Worm 
Hole Attack, Colluding Misrelay attack. 
Black Hole Attack: In this, the attacker sends a fake RREP packet establishing a route via the 
malicious node, thus intercepting the communicating packets passing through the malicious node.  
Link Spoofing Attack: This a type of route poisoning attack that advertises a fake link causing the 
target node to select the attacker as its MPR. 
Worm Hole Attack: One of more sophisticated attacks is this worm hole attack. A pair of colluding 
attackers uses a high speed private network to intrude the network. The pair of malicious nodes record and 
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replay the packets thus disrupting the authenticity and confidentiality of the message communicated over 
the network. 
Colluding Misrelay Attack: again like worm hole attack uses a pair of attackers to modify or drop 
packets thus disrupting the routing information. 
 
2.2. Secured Routing Protocols in MANET 
 
Securing the route can be done in two ways, either preventing the attack or detecting and recovering of the 
attack [5, 6]. The taxonomy of the secured routing protocol in both aspects of prevention and detection is 
shown in the chart below: 
 
 
Fig. 1. Taxonomy of secured routing protocols. 
 
Various Researches have proposed many secured routing protocols for MANETs, modifying the 
routing algorithms embedding with security based measures [7, 8].  Some of the common secured reactive 
routing protocols existing are ARAN, SRP, SAR, SEAD, Ariadne, SLSP, and SAODV. Each algorithm has 
various security mechanisms to authenticate the user during the route discovery process. Table 1 gives a 
brief overview of the security features of the secured routing protocols.  
 
Table  1. Features of Secured Routing Protocols. 
Secured 
Routing 
Protocol 
Cryptography 
Mechanism 
Secret Keys MAC 
Digital 
Signature 
Hash Chain Verification 
ARAN Asymmetric     
Trusted 
Certificate 
Server 
SAR Symmetric Based on trust level specified by the sender 
SRP Symmetric 
SA b/w Src & 
Dest. 
MAC with KS   MAC 
SEAD 
One way Hash 
Chain 
Initial Secret 
Key 
  
Authenticate 
routing table 
metric & 
Sequence 
number 
Hash Chain 
ARIADNE 
One way Hash 
chain 
Secret MAC 
Keys 
MAC  KSD 
TESLA Key 
Authentication 
 Hash Chain 
SLSP 
Hybrid 
(Threshold 
Cryptography 
 MAC   
MAC 
Verification 
SAODV 
Public & Private 
keys for each 
pair of users 
  
The sender uses 
digital signatures 
to sign the 
messages 
One way 
hash chain to 
authenticate 
hop count 
Digital 
Signature 
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Among the above the secured routing protocols mentioned, ARAN, SAR , SRP, ARIADNE and 
SAODV are based on reactive routing protocols while SLSP and SEAD are based on proactive routing 
protocols. Each protocol has its own pros and cons which is used as per the application requirement of the 
network. The strength and weakness of the various above mentioned protocols are discussed in Table 2 
 
Table 2. Strength & weakness of secured routing protocols. 
Secured 
Routing 
Protocol 
Secures from Strength Weakness 
ARAN Modification, fabrication, 
impersonation 
Less complexity in terms of 
implementation 
Expensive, not immune to worm hole 
attack 
SAR Modification Dynamic Choice of routes, cost 
benefit 
Not always shortest path is selected 
SRP Detect & Discard bogus replies, 
fabrication of routing packets 
Immune to IP spoofing Prone to Route cache poisoning, not 
immune to work hole attack 
SEAD Modification of routing 
information broadcasting 
Efficient in terms of CPU & energy 
usage 
Not immune to worm hole attack 
ARIADNE Modification, fabrication of 
routing information, flooding 
Immune to worm hole attack Selfish nodes are not taken into 
account 
SLSP Prevent spoofing at the data link 
layer 
Can operate at recurrently changing 
topology 
Provide assurance only benign control 
traffic 
SAODV Modification, impersonation Authenticate in-transit routing 
packets 
Additional storage requirements. 
 
Security extensions for existing routing protocols do not contain important performance optimizations. 
Inclusion of optimistic approaches provides a better trade-off between security and performance. ARAN 
(Authenticated Routing for Ad Hoc Networks) and Ariadne are based on DSR of which Ariadne is 
immune to wormhole attack. Similarly SAR (Security Aware Routing) and SAODV ( Secure Ad Hoc On 
Demand Distance Vector) routing are implemented  on AODV while SRP (Secure Routing Protocol) is  an 
algorithm compatible with all the reactive routing protocols [6]. 
ARIADNE: This reactive secure routing protocol strongly depends on symmetric cryptography. 
Ariadne uses a shared secret key (KS,D) shared between source and destination, and at each intermediate 
node is authenticated by TESLA key that authenticate the route discovery process chain, after which the 
RREQ  packets are forwarded thus guaranteeing  secured route discovery. [8, 9] 
Point to point authentication using message authentication codes and shared key is a significant feature 
of ARIADNE. Immunity against wormhole attack and route cache poisoning attacks adds to major 
strengths of this protocol . 
SAODV: The Secure Ad hoc on Demand distance Vector protocol is designed based on AODV routing 
protocol. This scheme used public key certificates for all the participating nodes in the network. The initiator 
of the route discovery appends its RSA signature and a last element of hash chain to the routing packets [10]. 
The intermediate node verifies the signature of the sender before updating the reverse route. The destination 
node signs the RREP with its private key where the intermediate nodes again verify the sender signature, 
thus protecting against any illegitimate node getting into the route discovery. The security features provided 
by SAODV includes integrity, authentication and non-repudiation. [8, 11, 12] 
SRP: The Secure Routing Protocol as proposed by P. Papadimitratos et al. [13] is specially designed to 
be compatible with any of the reactive routing protocols. SRP is combative to bogus route reply packets 
authenticating the destination and the intermediate nodes. The significance of the SRP is that it wangles 
correct topological information about the network [8]. SRP operation is based on establishing a Security 
Association (SA) between the source and destination nodes, thus authenticating the routing messages along 
with the communicating parties. A hybrid key distribution procedure is used to establish the SA. A secret 
symmetric key (KS, D) is exchanged between the sender and the destination with the public keys of the each 
other. Source (S) and destination (D) authenticate routing messages over the secured channel by the secret 
symmetric key (KS, D). SRP scrapes with colluding misrelay attacks, and also replay, fabrication attacks. When 
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SRP is implemented with DSR, it requires a 6-word header with the unique identifiers of route discovery 
process and message authentication code (MAC) computed using a keyed hash algorithm. 
All the above discussed secured versions of routing protocols does not possess performance 
optimizations which could provide a better trade-off between security and performance [14, 15]. On the 
basis of the comparative study of the secured routing protocols, performance analysis based on link stability 
in ARIADNE, SAODV and SRP protocols are studied and the results are discussed below. 
 
3. Link Stability 
 
The packet delivery in a MANET relies on the relaying of packets from a source to a series of forwarding 
nodes until they reach the desired destination. Hence the reliability of these networks depends on the 
robustness of the link communications between forwarding nodes. In MANETs, a source must establish a 
route to the destination either proactively or reactively prior to actual data transmissions. In this process, a 
set of forwarding nodes is selected to form a route between the source and the destination depending on 
the routing strategy. Due to the mobility of the nodes, this route may remain stable for a finite time period 
before a link breakage occurs, and link repair or route reestablishment must take place. Figures 2(a) and 
2(b) depict a typical scenario of link stability. In Fig. 2(a) data packets are sent from node S to D forwarded 
via node A. As the destination D moves from the frequency bands of A to frequency band B, the data 
packets from S take a different route via B. 
 
Fig. 2. (a) Initial scenario. 
 
 
 
Fig. 2. (b) Changed scenario after mobility of destination. 
 
Inevitably, a brief pause of data transmissions, or more seriously, a disconnection of a communication 
session between the source and the destination may appear. Hence, prediction of the robustness of a link in 
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terms of link connectivity duration provides insight to the reliability of the communications and helps 
improve the routing protocol design. 
In this present work, the individual link stability is evaluated by modeling the period of time a link 
between two adjacent forwarding nodes remains connected and the time taken to resume the connectivity 
in case of disconnection due to mobility of nodes.  
Considering all links in an established route between the source and the destination, the connectivity period, 
is further analyzed by measuring the period of time an end-to-end established route remains valid for 
packet forwarding. 
The link stability is analyzed by the time taken from the source to rebuild the route to the destination 
node after the node has moved to the new location. The time interval between link breakage and link 
formation which shows the link updating time for the source. The link breakage is identified by the sender 
and the forwarding nodes on receiving the RERR packet on which the source initiates the route discovery 
process updating its route cache with the new route. The analysis is simulated for three secured reactive 
routing protocols SAODV, ARIADNE and SRP using NS2. 
 
4. Simulation Study and Analysis 
 
4.1. Simulation Setup 
 
NS2 simulator is used to study the behavior of the routing protocols and their performance characteristics. 
The simulation is run for 50 nodes with 45, 30 and 15 connections for all the three protocols and the 
performance factors like packet delivery fraction, throughput and end to end delay are analyzed along with 
link stability factor. The network area is taken as 500 square meters. The simulation environment details are 
given in Table 3. 
Packet Delivery Fraction (PDF): The ratio between the number of data packets received and the 
number of packets sent. Packet Delivery Fraction (PDF) = Total Packets Delivered to destination / Total 
Packets Generated. Mathematically, it can be expressed as:  
 

 
1
1 e f
f f
R
P
c N
 
where P is the fraction of successfully delivered packets, C is the total number of flow or connections, f is 
the  unique flow id serving as an index, Rf is the count of packets. 
Throughput: Throughput is total packets successfully delivered to individual destinations over total 
time divided by total time. The amount of data transferred from one place to another or processed in a 
specified amount of time. Data transfer rates for disk drives and networks are measured in terms of 
throughput. Typically, throughputs are measured in kbps, Mbps and Gbps  
 throughput=(total no.of bytes received /simulation time)*(8/1000) kbps 
End-to-End Delay: It is the ratio of time difference between every CBR packet sent and received to 
the total time difference over the total number of CBR packets received. It refers to the time taken for a 
packet to be transmitted across a network from source to destination.  
 Detoe = N(Dtrans+Dprop+Dproc) 
where Dtrans = Transmission delay; 
Dprop = Propagation delay; 
Dproc = Processing delay; 
N = Number of links [number of routers+1]. 
Link Stability: The link stability is measured by analyzing the link breakage time and new route 
acquisition time.  The time interval between link breakage and the time of new route acquisition is the time 
take for routing table to update with the new route to the destination on mobility. The lesser the time taken 
for updating the route cache with new route interprets how quickly the connectivity break is resumed to 
maintain the stability of the link. The number of packets dropped is also accounted to estimate the 
performance of the link reliability during the mobility of the nodes.  The number of packets dropped is 
computed as the difference between the number of packets generated at the source and the number of 
packets received by the destination node. The following graphs depict the results simulated for the 
simulation setup discussed in Table 3 for study. The security parameters setup is also given in Table 4. 
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Table 3. Simulation parameters. 
Parameter Values 
Traffic type CBR (constant bit rate) 
Simulation time 100 seconds, 200 seconds 
Number of nodes 50 
Pause time 0,25,50,75 and 100 seconds 
Maximum connections 45 
Number of nodes per route 10 
Mobility Model Random Way point model 
Topology Size 500m x 500 m 
 
 
Table 4. Protocol specific parameters. 
Protocol Parameter Values 
ARIADNE 
TESLA Time Interval 1 second 
Hash Length 80 bits 
 
4.2. Results and Discussions 
 
SRP, SAODV and ARIADNE secured versions of MANET routing protocols are simulated for the study 
using NS2. As SRP is compatible with any of the reactive routing protocols it is implemented with TORA 
for the present study, SAODV is the secured version of AODV while ARIADNE is the secured version of 
DSR routing protocols respectively. The simulation results of link stability of secured routing protocols are 
presented in this section and given in Figs 3-7. Figure 3 shows the time of the link being disconnected that 
the time when the intermediate nodes starts broadcasting the RERR message to the source and the other 
neighboring nodes. 
 
 
Fig. 3. Link breakage time for the distance moved by the node. 
 
In Fig. 4, the time when the source node resumes the communication via the new route is plotted. 
Figure 5 shows that the time taken for the route cache to get updated with the new route information 
increases with the distance moved, on an average compared with the pause time for the mobility and from 
the graph it is distinct that ARIADNE takes lesser time to update the route cache with new route than 
SAODV and SRP. 
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Fig. 4. New route acquisition time. 
 
 
 
Fig. 5. Time taken to update the new route in the route cache. 
 
Figure 6 shows the updating time almost similar with the distance as a factor. From Figs. 5 and 6 it is 
evident that ARIADNE performs better than the SAODV & SRP consume less time to update new route 
to maintain the link stability avoiding packet loss. 
 
 
Fig. 6. Time taken for new route updating for various pause times. 
 
The resultant impact on the link stability is shown in Fig. 7, where the number packets dropped is 
minimized in the case of ARIADNE than the other two protocols. As the pause time is increased more 
time available for the route updating in case of link breakage and hence the number of packets dropped is 
also reduced. 
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Fig. 7. Packet dropped with varying pause times. 
 
Figures 8 to 10 depict the other performance factors analyzed for the present set of secured reactive routing 
protocols under study in this paper. 
 
 
Fig. 8. Packet delivery fraction. 
 
It is evident from Fig. 8 that at pause time 0 sec, ARIADNE  has a better PDF value when compared 
to SAODV and SRP. And also ARIADNE gives better performance with increasing pause time. 
 
 
Fig. 9. Comparison on basis of throughput. 
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Fig. 10. Comparison on basis of end-to-end delay at maximum connection 15. 
 
The analysis of Figs. 9 and 10 shows that among the three secured protocols ARIADNE, SAODV and 
SRP, overall ARIADNE gives a better performance in terms of packet delivery fraction, throughput and 
end to end delay. ARIADNE has a higher percentage of packet delivery and hence increased throughput 
with minimum end to end delay than SAODV and SRP. 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
This study is done for average networks set up in terms of topology area size, number of the nodes in the 
move, an average constant mobility speed and fixed number of intermediate nodes per route. Here the 
assumption is taken as what is the case when the link breakage is due to the mobility of the destination 
node, while there are situations link may get disconnected either of the source or intermediate nodes also 
are on move simultaneously during communication and the impact of higher mobility speed the number of 
nodes per route are not taken into consideration in the present study. From the above results it is distinct 
that ARIADNE outperforms the other secured routing protocols taken for the present study due to the 
case of SAODV and SRP the security mechanisms of digital signatures, query identifiers for the 
establishment of security association etc., are done at every node by itself that consumes time leading to 
delay in packet delivery while ARIADNE is a single point of certificate authority for authorizing the nodes 
giving a better performance.  
A comprehensive analysis have been carried out on the various security issues in routing the MANET 
and given a brief overview of the features of the various secured routing protocols designed for MANETs. 
Further a performance analysis based on the link stability in three of secured routing protocols is presented. 
The algorithms has its own merits based on the scenario, hence no single protocol could be credited as the 
best for the network. The selection of the protocol depends on the type of data and network being used for 
communication, whether more confidential data or whether the nodes are less or more mobile. The small 
pause time in the data transmission intrudes a small amount delay in packet delivery, which intolerable in 
multimedia data. The procedures to overcome this packet delay due to link breakage and link updating in 
case of faster mobility is not yet worked on which is one of the demanding research requirements in 
MANET routing. There is still a high tradeoff between high security and performance issues like power 
control, accommodating multiple classes of traffic which are yet to be addressed in designing a good 
secured routing protocol. 
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